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I Introduction
Three trends definé how relationships between
official donors and non-governmental develop-
ment organisations (NGOs) have been structured
for at least the past five years. First, NGOs operat-
ing around the globe have mushroomed, partly in
response to the availability of greater donor fund-
ing for NGO activity Second, many donor agen-
cies are reducing the numbers of direct hire staff
they have in the field, often in an attempt to cut
back their overall operatïng budgets or to manage
programmes using fewer administrative resources.
This lack of staff in the field means that donor insti-
tutional knowledge of national and local NGOs is
limited, as are the personal relationships that foster
trust and allow for deeper relationships with
NGOs. Third, donor agencies are more likely to
use contracts rather than open-ended grants to
NGOs, since the donor retains greater control in a
contract or cooperative agreement than it does in a
grant. The net result? At a time when NGOs have
increased involvement with official donors (bilat-
eral and multilateral) and their own governments,
they actually have less influence over how develop-
ment assistance resources are spent.
This article explores these trends and discusses
what they mean for donorNGO relationships,
suggesting how NGOs' limited influence ultimately
affects beneficiaries of development assistance.
Three recommendations are put forward to alter
the relationships between donors and NGOs in
order to offer beneficiaries a greater stake in the
decisions that affect their lives. First, relationships
between donors and NGOs should be reconfigured
to recognise their interdependence. Currently, there
is a perception that donors provide resources to
NGOs, and the contribution that NGOs make to
the equation has been minimised. Second, donor
agencies need to reform their own institutions. In
particular they must modify financial reporting
and other requirements put in place to ensure fis-
cal accountability, so that these conditions
strengthen ties between and development account-
ability to beneficiaries and to NGOs, rather than
reorienting NGOs to focus on donors. Finally,
donors can institutionalise NGO consultation at
every stage of the aid relationship, including policy
decisions, rather than relying on NGOs to imple-
ment donor agendas. In a world of increasing NGO
voices, donors should give special preference to
those which have proven and effective ties with
development beneficiaries.
2 NGO Explosion
When, in January 2000, The Economist published an
article on the role of NGOs in global governance,
NGOs had truly arrived. Three full pages in The
Economist surely indicated that NGOs were now
officially part of the international establishment! As
a 1995 UN report on global governance revealed,
there are nearly 29,000 international NGOs. The
number of national NGOs are even greater. In
Russia, there are at least 65,000; in Kenya almost
250 are created every year. In Nepal the number of
NGOs registered with the government increased
dramatically from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993. In
Tunisia in 1988, there were 1,886 NGOs and three
years later there were 5,186 (Edwards 1999:17). In
Bosnia in 1998, there were nearly 200 NGOs from
24 countries, and in that year alone it was projected
that these NGOs would spend US$1 billion on
activities (Hudock 1999:10). The Red Cross reports
that NGOs now disburse more money than the
World BankJ
Why the dramatic increase in numbers of NGOs
working both internationally and within their own
national boundaries? Critical observers contend
that it is due in large part to the increase in donor
funding available for NGO activity Increasingly,
bilateral assistance has been channelled to NGOs,
especially those in developing countries (van Rooy
2000). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) reports that the propor-
tion of total aid from member countries channelled
through NGOs rose from 0.7 in 1975 to 3.6 per
cent in 1985, and at least 5 per cent in 1993/94,
some US$2.3 billion in absolute terms. Snapshots
of individual donors' assistance to NGOs reveal the
dramatic increase in the pace as well as the levels of
funding awarded. The UK-based Overseas
Development Institute reports that in the ten years
to 1993/94, the UK increased its official funding of
NGOs by almost 400 per cent. In 1994, Swedish
NGOs received 85 per cent of their funding from
official aid sources. In 1993, officiaI development
assistance (ODA) to Canadian NGOs reached 70
per cent of their total income, while in the US, of all
the funding NGOs receive, 66 per cent originates
from official sources.
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Perhaps more significantly, southern NGOs have
received increased amounts of direct assistance
from official development sources. The European
Union has over US$80 million, which is available to
southern NGOs. Not surprisingly the larger, more
established NGOs, such as those in Bangladesh for
example, receive a disproportionate amount of the
funding dispersed by the Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA) to Bangladeshi NGOs
(Bennett and Gibbs 1996).
Another explanation for the rise of this element of
the 'third sector' is that there is an associational rev-
olution underway a revolution so dramatic that it
fundamentally redefines governance by redistribut-
ing power from the state to civil society (Mathews
1997). This may be exaggerated, since civil society
organisations are often themselves non- or anti-
democratic in terms of organisational structure and
operation, and many are not sustainable over the
long term since they rely so heavily on donor fund-
ing. Moreover, this dependence threatens their
autonomy and ability to challenge power struc-
tures such as the state or the international donor
community
In spite of these shortcomings, Edwards suggests:
These are exciting times, when new relation-
ships are developing between unlikely bedfel-
lows - NGOs and businesses, municipalities
and banks, international organisations and citi-
zens' groups. Increasingly international regimes
are made up of diverse relationships between
different sectors of society with nation states
functioning less as sovereign entities and more
as components of an 'international polity'
holding local and global governance mecha-
nisms to account but playing a smaller role in a
larger system.'
(Edwards 1999:17)
These 'exciting times' reached fever pitch late last
year when diverse coalitions of NGOs disrupted the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations in
Seattle, surprising many politicians and corporate
interests with their organisation, use of the media
for their own ends, and collective strength. In the
aftermath of Seattle, The Economist (11 December
19 99:20) reflected on the failure of the WTO event
and suggested that, 'Some will celebrate this as the
advent of the age when huge institutions will heed
the voice of Everyman. Others will complain that
self-appointed advocates have gained too much
influence. What is certain is that a new kind of actor
is claiming, loudly, a seat at the table'.
Or, was Seattle just a moment? A fleeting success
unsustainable on a daily basis? Yes and no. On the
one hand, NGOs do have greater influence, access,
media and advocacy savvy and technological capa-
bility to influence the international agenda. In 1992
at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, NGOs gen-
erated enough public pressure to push through
agreements on controlling greenhouse gases. The
World Bank's anniversary meeting in 1994 was
dominated by protestors with a Fifty Years is
Enough' campaign. Hundreds of NGOs worked
with the Canadian government to outlaw land-
mines, and the coordinating NGO won a Nobel
Prize for its efforts. More recently, a global coalition
of NGOs called Jubilee 2000 has successfully lob-
bied for a dramatic reduction in the debts of the
poorest countries, and raised this issue to the top of
the international communities' agenda.
3 Scaling Back and Contracting
Out
NGOs might be more powerful now than ever at the
corporate, national and international level.
However, on a daily basis their relationships with
donor agencies and greater access to them has not
translated to greater ability to influence the neo-lib-
eral development agenda (see Introduction) or the
allocation of development resources. Why? Donor
agencies are changing the way they do business.
Many donors have put fewer people in the field and
are using more contractors to do their work. This is
in part a response to criticisms that NGOs spend
too much money on overhead costs such as staff
salaries and benefits, and not enough goes directly
to projects. lt is also a direct result of the decrease
in overall official development assistance that has
been available, in spite of the increased allocation of
funds channelled through NGOs.
Bennett and Gibbs (1996:41) note that the early
1 990s witnessed a stagnation and notable decline in
the volumes of ODA from OECD nations to devel-
oping countries. From 1992-93, total ODA declined
from $61 billion to $56 billion, representing a 5 per
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cent reduction in real terms. They suggest that this
decline signifies a reduced commitment from
northern donors to development, and that at least
for southern NGOs wanting to access these reduced
funds, the means by which this funding is chan-
nelled may be of greater significance than its total
quantity'.
As donors have less staff in the field and try to do
more with fewer resources, they are relying on
international NGOs registered in the donor country
(and therefore accountable to government) to
administer their programmes. With a decreased
field presence, donors are less able to forge sub-
stantial relationships with national NGOs or to
administer small grants programmes with local-
level NGOs. In addition, increased public scrutiny
and legislative oversight of donor agency pro-
grammes has forced them to 'show results' for
money spent. This 'management for results' culture
favours contracts over grants since the donor
agency is more able to control the direction of the
project and the activities carried out by the NGO
implementing it. Grants are more open-ended and
allow the NGO greater discretion as to how it
implements a project, creating a greater risk for the
donor, who has to account for the resources spent.
The new development orthodoxy, however, flies in
the face of this reality. lt dictates that active
participation by a wider variety of stakeholders
must be sought in planning and designing policies
and programmes in order to ensure local commit-
ment and action in implementing and maintaining
them. Again, this is driven by the desire for results.
In 1992, the World Bank evaluation department
reported a strong correlation between various indi-
cators of 'ownership' and the satisfactoriness of out-
comes. Where ownership was high, projects
achieved good results and where it was low, pro-
grammes were ineffective. In 1994 the World
Development Report highlighted the need for 'user
involvement' in project design and operation, as
well as in decision-making and agreements as to the
sharing of benefits and costs (Woods 2000:824).
In spite of the World Bank's rhetoric about the
importance of NGOs, and the latter increased
interaction with the World Bank, NGOs have not
necessarily influenced its activities or policies. A
recent article in The Economist (December 11,
1999:21) claims that the 'Bank has made a huge
effort to co-opt them'. As evidence, the article cites
the more than 70 NGO specialists working in the
Bank's field offices; it flotes that half the number of
World Bank projects last year involved NGOs; that
alliances have been forged between the highest level
of the World Bank and civil society organisations,
including religious groups, thereby 'diluting the
strength of these mobilisation networks and
increasing the relative power of the technical NGOs'
that the World Bank has already co-opted by
involving them in project implementation and eval-
uation. (See Introduction and Malena in this
volume.)
A review (Nelson 1995) of 304 World Bank projects
which involved NGOs between 1973 and 1990
assessed the nature of NGO involvement, the char-
acter of the NGOs involved, and particularly the
growth in the number of projects with NGO
involvement since 1988. Of these projects, only 76
featured interaction with NGOs where the NGOs
were engaged beyond project implementation.
These projects were unusual since they involved
NGOs in project design, included direct funding of
NGO projects by a Bank-financed fund, or involved
conflict between the Bank's project managers and
NGOs over the outcomes of the projects. These 76
projects represent the most intensive project interac-
tion to date, and the kind of interaction, that the
Bank claims to want with more NGOs.
lt is not enough for NGOs to have a seat at the
donor table. If donors involve NGOs because they
want to increase development effectiveness, then
they need to alter their relationships with NGOs in
ways that give them greater influence over donors'
policies and programmes. As Fowler (2000:1) sug-
gests, 'international aid would be more effective,
equitable, just and credible if a relational power
shift occurs. Relationships need to be more in
favour of those frequently least able to negotiate
from a position of adequate capacity and relative
strength'.
There are three ways that relationships between
donors and NGOs can be altered to offer beneficia-
ries a greater stake in the decisions that affect their
lives. The first would be to do away with the notion
of partnership, since that obscures the two-way
nature of these donorNGO exchanges, and instead
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focus on 'inter-organisational influence' (Hudock
1999:18). The term 'partnership' reflects an idealis-
tic notion of what interactions between donors and
NGOs should be like, rather than providing an
accurate description of what they are actually like.
Many exchanges between donors and NGOs can be
characterised as isolated incidents, rather than part
of a larger process, which the term 'partnership'
implies. Very few are based on the types of equal
exchange that are inherent to any real notion of
partnership. DonorNGO relationships have been
dominated and even dictated by donors, since they
are providing the resources necessary for develop-
ment work. This tends to obscure NGOs' contribu-
tion to donors specifically, and to the development
process generally
An alternative framework of inter-organisational
influence suggests that exchanges are predicated on
one organisation desire to extract resources (finan-
cial, material, informational) from another and that
these exchanges are two-way, with different actors
affected to varying degrees by their interactions. It
suggests the degree to which an organisation pos-
sessing resources can exercise control over those
seeking resources.
Changing relationships between donors and NGOs
is not impossible. The first step is to view these rela-
tionships not as a zero-sum game in which there are
always winners and losers, but as interdependent.
Altering donors' relationships with NGOs can ben-
efit donors by increasing their development effec-
tïveness and therefore the ability to attract
development assistance. Altering donors' and
NGOs' relationships could help NGOs to work
responsively and flexibly with development benefi-
ciaries, rather than making them responsive to the
directives of donors. Ultimately, it is this shift that
will benefit the recipients of development assis-
tance, for then activities will address their own
needs as they have identified them. The seat of
NGOs at the donor table is only meaningful when
NGOs can use their access to donors to influence
their policies and programmes in a way that
empowers development beneficiaries. As long as
NGOs are doing donors' bidding, they are serving
the dinner rather than enjoying the food.
Donor information demands can be onerous for
NGOs, and altering these conditions can help to
strengthen the ties between development beneficia-
ries and NGOs, rather than emphase NGOs'
accountability to donors. Donors are required to
collect information from NGOs in order to report to
the public or the government as to how the devel-
opment resources they have given to the NGOs are
spent. Donors can, however, change the type of
information they gather from NGOs and develop-
ment beneficiaries as well as the way in which they
gather it. Donors can implement evaluations and
monitoring programmes that are participatory,
qualitative as well as quantitative, and rely on indi-
cators for success designed by development benefi-
ciaries and negotiated between all stakeholders at
the beginning of the project.
Finally, donors can institutionalise consultation
with NGOs at all stages of the aid relationship,
starting with policy decisions - policy related to
donor operations as well as the foreign policy guid-
ing the development intervention. If, as The
Economist (December 11, 1999:21) reports, 'NGOs
now deliver more aid than the whole United
Nations system' it is important for NGOs to influ-
ence both the policy that determines how and why
that aid goes where it does, and the programmes
through which it is channelled.
There is a range of NGOs, and donors don't have
the time or even the inclination to try to consult
with all of them. It would be useful, however, for
donors to make a systematic effort to identify cred-
ible NGOs that have proven ties with development
beneficiaries, These NGOs should help to shape
donor decision making. Clearly, there will be prob-
lems with conflicts of interest, since NGOs are
likely to support policies and programmes that ben-
efit themselves in the long term. There are a num-
ber of ways to work around this, such as separating
substantive debate that will inform grants and loans
from discussions that will determine priorities, pro-
grammes and policies.
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Once these changes are made in donorNGO rela-
tionships, donors' programmes will be more effec-
tive and NGOs will be more responsive to their
beneficiaries. The two are mutually reinforcing.
Ultimately, NGOs' influence is only desirable when
they use that influence to benefit those for whom
development assistance is intended. Otherwise, the
rhetoric of NGOs' increased influence will not
translate to reality
Note
1 These are net positive transfers after loan repayments
are taken into account.
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